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Globalization, (fighting) corruption and development: how are  these 
phenomena linearly and nonlinearly related in wealth effects?
Purpose – Is globalization instrumental in fighting corruption? Do wealth effects matter in 
this fight? Are findings valid when linearity assumptions are dropped? This paper assesses the 
Lalountas et  al.(2011) hypotheses in the African context.
 
Design/methodology/approach –   Though  not  form,  yet  in  substance  the  intuition  and 
motivation are compatible with those of Lalountas et al.(2011). Four hypotheses are tested 
from  different  methodological  and  contextual  standpoints.   In  the  analysis,  while  the 
economic  and  social  dimensions  of  globalization  are  reflected  in  the  HDI,  the  political 
dimension is captured by good governance indicators. A TSLS-IV estimation technique is 
applied  where-in  globalization  instruments  of  trade  and  financial  liberalization  are 
instrumented  on  human-development   and  government-quality  to  account  for  corruption 
(corruption-control) effects. Thus the intuition is assessing how globalization is instrumental 
in the fight against corruption through human development(economic and social dimensions) 
and government quality(political dimension). 
Findings –  Hypothesis  1:  Globalization  is  a  powerful  tool  in  fighting  corruption  (True). 
Hypothesis 2: Globalization is an important tool in fighting corruption only in Middle and 
High income countries(Partially True). Hypothesis 3: For Low income countries globalization 
has no significant impact on corruption(True).  Hypothesis 4:  Hypotheses  1 and 2 are valid 
only under linearity(False). 
Social Implications –   In countries with high levels of per capita, emphasis is placed on the 
political and social dimensions of globalization and as a result the effects of this phenomenon 
on corruption-control  are significant.  Conversely,  in nations  with low levels  of per capita 
income, emphasis is given to the economic dimension of international integration and as a 
result the effect of globalization on corruption is limited. As a policy implication, persistent 
globalization as an effective means to reduce corruption in developing countries might lead to 
inappropriate policies in low income countries. 
Originality/value –  This  paper  has  tested  the  Lalountas  et  al.(2011)  hypotheses  in  the 
continent where concerns of globalization, human development and corruption are most acute. 
JEL Classification: F10; F30; I30; O10; O55
Keywords: Globalization; Corruption; Wealth effects; Africa  
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1. Introduction
Is globalization a tool in the fight against corruption? How does globalization in terms 
of trade  openness and financial liberalization affect corrupt practices and the fight against 
corruption through human development in developing countries? How are these  phenomena 
related in wealth effects? Are findings different under linear and nonlinear conditions? This 
paper addresses the above concerns within the context of Africa in the light of Lalountas et 
al.(2011) hypotheses:  “Thus, our main conclusion is that globalization  could be a powerful  
means of fighting corruption, only for middle and high income countries. For low income  
countries however, globalization has no significant impact on corruption. We might therefore  
conclude that at low levels of per capita income emphasis is given to the economic dimension  
of international integration and as a result the effect of globalization on corruption is limited.  
Persistence  on  globalization  as  an effective  means  to  reduce  corruption  in  developing  
countries might lead to inappropriate policies. On the contrary, at high levels of per capita  
income emphasis is given to the political and social dimensions of globalization and as a  
result the effects of this phenomenon on corruption control are significant”(Lalountas et al., 
2011, p.645). 
There is abundant literature on the determinants of corruption(La Porta et al.,1999; 
Treisman,2000;  Iwasaki  & Suzuki,2012)  and  effects  of  globalization  on  corruption(Gatti, 
1999; Das & DiRienzo, 2009). However very few studies have been dedicated to the indirect 
relationship between corruption and globalization despite a substantial bulk of literature on 
the indirect  link between the two phenomena(Bonaglia  et  al.,2001; Lalountas et  al.,2011). 
This paper therefore assesses how globalization affects corruption via human development. 
But on what foundations are the phenomena choices of the paper based? Firstly, the choice of 
human development as a globalization channel is based on the fact that globalization upholds 
a  global commitment to continuing and accelerating the pace of human development. In fact 
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the  phenomenon  is  the  dominant  force  in  the  economic  universe  as  it  upholds  economic 
prosperity in its lusty, ineluctable and historical process whose march can be stopped only by 
endangering the prosperity of peoples and nations. Globalization also threatens to disfigure 
human  development  in  the  manner  it  is  evolving  as  it  seeks  a  victory  of  market  over 
government  and self-interest  over  altruism(Asongu,2012a).  Therefore  not  surprisingly,  the 
public support for globalization has waned in both developed and developing countries with a 
frantic search for a third-way out of the morally enervating regime of unvarnished capitalism. 
This  has  prompted  universal  demands  to  recapture  some  of  its  attractive  glow and  lofty 
ambitions; that the superior claims of globalization be given a ‘human face” by saddling the 
increasingly ungovernable world of trade  and finance  with a  global  civic  ethic.  With  the 
choice of  human development  as a channel  cemented,  we turn to a justification for  the 
context of the study. Secondly, the choice of Africa is most relevant giving the continent’s 
appalling statistics in development(human and economic) and corruption. 
This  paper  on a  first  note  contributes  to  existing  literature  by examining  the  four 
concerns highlighted at the first paragraph of this introduction. Secondly,  the use of much 
recent  data(2002-2010)  provides  more  updated  policy  implications.  Thirdly,  the  focus  on 
Africa where the human development and corruption debates are most tensed, helps elicit 
some glaring issues on structural adjustment policies(liberalization for the most part) imposed 
by the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and World Bank(WB) in bid to improve human 
development. Fourthly, we cut adrift arbitrary income cut-off  limits(Lalountas et al., 2011)1 
by examining wealth effects from four dimensions: low income, middle income, upper middle 
income and lower middle income. 
1 Whereas   Lalounta et al.(2011) use a threshold of :  GDP>825 US Dollars,   we use four levels of income 
distribution in accordance with the World Bank Income group setting.  The groups include: low income, $1,005  
or  less;  lower middle income,  $1,006 - $3,975;  upper middle income,  $3,976 -  $12,275;  and high  income, 
$12,276 or more.
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The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We  review  existing  literature  on 
globalization, human development and corruption in Section 2.  Data and methodology are 
presented and discussed respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Globalization, human development and corruption 
2.1 Theoretical highlights 
2.1.1 Globalization and human development 
Borrowing from Thai(2006) two theories prevail in the debate over how globalization 
affects human well-being: the neoliberal and the hegemony schools of thought. The  second 
school  sees  globalization  as  a  new hegemonic  project.  According to  Petras  & Veltmeyer 
(2001), globalization demonstrates the creation of a new world order architecture by global 
powers(industrial countries, international financial institutions…etc), with main objective of 
facilitating capitalist accumulation in an environment of unconstrained market transactions. 
Petras & Veltmeyer(2001,p.24) predict ‘a world-wide crisis of living standards for labor’: 
since the brunt of the capitalist  openness process has been borne by the working class as 
‘technological  change and economic  reconversion  endemic  to  capitalist  development  has  
generated  an enormous growing pool  of  surplus  labor,  an industrial  reserve army…with  
incomes at  or below the level  of  subsistence’.  Another  strand of this  school upholds that 
contemporary global systems on their neoliberal course have imposed a ‘flexible’ mode of 
production  that  undermine  the  redistributive  mechanisms  that  were  constructed  through 
Keynesian social  democracy.   As noticed by Smart(2003) globalization features a ‘market 
ethos’  whose  fervent  pursuit  of  private  interest  operates  without  regard  for  persons(Thai, 
2006). In acknowledging this assertion Scholte(2000) posits, an unequal allocation of benefits 
is generated that favors the already advantaged. Though this radical stance is not explicitly 
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shared  by  Sirgy  et  al.(2004),  they  do  predict  several  negative  effects  when  asserting 
globalization has ‘double-bladed’ outcomes.
The neoliberal  thesis(first school) contends globalization is an omnipresent power of 
‘creative  destruction’  in  that  global  trade,  cross-border  investment  and  technological 
innovation  improve  production  efficiency  and  generate  extraordinary  prosperity  despite 
replacement of old jobs and fall in wages for unskilled workers. Openness manages these 
potential threats by signaling to the latter group about the pay-offs from acquiring new skills. 
Rewards can stretch over to the masses ‘if the labor market is responsive to changes in supply  
and demand’(Grennes, 2003). Empirical studies have also documented that globalization is 
fashioned  to  spread  industrialization  to  developing  countries  and  hence  mitigate   global 
income inequality(Firebaugh, 2004). Rodrik et al.(2004) find foreign trade to be closely tied 
to societal institutional building; which constitute a decisive factor in economic growth. 
 
2.1.2 Globalization and corruption  
How  does  openness  influence  the  level  of  perceived  corruption  in  a  country? 
According to  Klitgaard(1988),  corruption thrives when monopoly power is combined with 
discretion and low accountability.  Incentives to bribery do not arise in a society where all 
economic activities are carried out in a perfect competition setting and no single agent is able 
to affect the price or the quantity of the commodity  he/she sells or buys. In the same line of  
thought,  corruption is  mitigated when economic rents do not depend on the discretionary 
power  of  some  public  officials  or  when  monopolistic  economic  activities  as  well  as 
governments are objects of strict rules of accountability. As emphasized by  Treisman(2000) 
in Bonaglia et al.(2001) political openness to protestant traditions leads to a higher quality of 
government.  Conversely,  corruption  is  more  pervasive  when  the  state  is  federal,  when  a 
country’s democratic basis is still young(less than 20 years) or when a country is less open to 
trade; consistent with Klitgaard(1988). 
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2.2 Factors linking globalization and corruption
In line with  Bonaglia et al.(2001) from Krueger  (1974),  financial and trade openness 
may  alter  the  balance  between  corruption  costs  and  benefits  through  the  following 
mechanisms(strands). 
The  first  mechanism  focuses  on  rent-seeking  activities  caused  by  quantitative 
restrictions  to  imports.  Contrary  to  tariffs,  quotas and  other  official  permissions,  imports 
generate  considerable  economic  rents  due  to  the  monopolistic  power  they  grant  to  legal 
importers. In a bid to appropriate these rents, agents may legally compete or embark in illegal 
rent-seeking  activities,  corruption,  bribery,  smuggling  and  black  markets.  Krueger(1974) 
demonstrates that these rent-seeking activities induce an economy to operate at a level below 
its optimal, generate a divergence between private and social costs and thus entail a welfare 
cost additional to that due to tariff restrictions.  In successive papers Kreuger’s original idea 
was generalized to a theory of tariffs(Bhagwati, & Srinivasan,1980) and Direct Unproductive 
Profit-Seeking(DUP) activities(Bhagwati,1982) in which further arguments were provided in 
favour  of  trade  and  capital  liberalizations.  In  a  later  study,  Gatti(1999)  presented  some 
empirical  evidence  on  the  link  between  ‘restrictions  to  openness’(trade  &  capital)  and 
corruption.  The empirical  analysis  disentangled two effects  of inward-oriented policies  on 
corruption: the ‘direct policy distortion’ and the ‘foreign competition effect’. High walls to 
international  transactions  directly  encourage  private  agents  to  bribe  public  officials  in 
exchange for favoritism(the first distortion) and through the second effect, reduce competition 
between domestic and foreign firms so that margins for rent-seeking and corruption are kept 
high.   
Ades  &  Di Tella(1999)  provide  evidence  for  the  second  competition-reducing 
mechanism. They posit that the level of rents in general and market structure in particular 
determine corruption intensity in an economy.  They further postulate that changes in rents 
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size due to variations in the degree of competition may have ambiguous effects on corruption. 
On the one hand, larger rents resulting from a low competition environment  increase the 
amount  bureaucrats  can extract as bribes;  on the other hand, under such circumstances,  it 
becomes  more  valuable  to  a  society  to  increase  accountability  and  monitoring  of  its 
bureaucracy.  Computing  the correct  sign of the net effect  of corruption due to these two 
opposing tendencies  may be  theoretically  relevant.  Real  world  cases  like  the  situation  in 
Nigeria provide examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption. Since the 
1980s, about 80% of government revenue in this country originate from oil exports. Resulting 
construction  and  import  booms  have  been  favorable  only  to  ruling  party  officials,  thus 
validating how rents cause corruption. Based on these facts Ades & Di Tella(1999) built a 
model that directly associates product market competition to fewer rents and lower corruption 
levels. This model identifies three set of variables that determine corruption: wages of the 
bureaucracy, monitoring degree, and the profit levels  that in turn depend on the degree of 
competition. Bureaucracy wages and monitoring are indirectly captured by a society’s level of 
political(respect of political rights) and economic(GDP per capita, schooling) developments, 
while competition is measured by the share of imports in GDP, the sector-concentration of 
exports and distance from the world’s major exporters.  Given the same level in the other 
variables, countries less exposed to foreign imports(or with a large share of exports due to 
natural  resources)  should  suffer  higher  levels  of  corruption  than  those  countries  more 
integrated in world markets and with a differentiated export basis. 
In  the  third  mechanism  linking  globalization  to  institutional  quality,  Wei(2000) 
explicitly considers differences in the cost of monitoring public officials due to the high level 
of international integration. The basic idea is plain: improving the quality of institutions and 
their capacity to fight corruption depend on the amount of resources a society allocates to this 
end. If a society invests more into building good institutions the larger the benefits it gets or  
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smaller costs it incurs. Given that foreign producers may divert their exports or investments 
from a national market to another with more ease than domestic producers, one would expect 
bad governance and corruption to be more detrimental to international trade and capital than 
domestic  commerce  and investment.  The differential  effect  of corruption induces  stronger 
incentives towards good governance investments for those economies that are open(in trade 
and  capital).  Ceteris  paribus,  due  to  the  resulting  interesting  benefits  an  economy  more 
exposed to international markets would allocate more resources to fighting corruption and 
end-up with a lower  corruption-level than one in isolation or autarky. 
In  the  last  strand  we argue  that,  the  three   mechanisms(strands)  elucidated  above 
culminate in human development. Thus human development is a mechanism through which 
trade and financial globalization affect government quality (in the respect of corruption). This 
paper therefore focuses on the fourth strand. While assessing the relations of these phenomena 
we shall also be testing the Lalountas et  al.(2011) hypotheses cited at the introduction of this 
work. 
2.3 Testable hypotheses 
 In line with   Lalountas et  al.(2011): “The estimation results indicate that, under the  
assumption of a linear model, a positive correlation between corruption and globalization  
exists, while when linearity is dropped there seems to be no significant effect of globalization  
on corruption. According to our analysis, linearity is a good approximation only for middle  
and high income countries. Hence, our main conclusion is that globalization is a powerful  
weapon against corruption only for middle and high income countries, while for low income  
countries globalization has no significant impact on corruption. For such countries fighting
corruption requires additional global action aiming at the reduction of poverty”(p.636). The 
following resulting hypotheses will be tested in the empirical section of this paper. 
Hypothesis 1: Globalization is a powerful tool in  fighting corruption. 
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Hypothesis 2: Globalization is an important tool in fighting corruption only in Middle and  
High income countries.
Hypothesis  3:  For  Low  income  countries  globalization has  no  significant  impact  on  
corruption.
Hypothesis 4: Hypotheses  one and two are valid only under linearity.
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We examine a sample 30 countries from African Development Indicators(ADI) of the 
World Bank(WB) disaggregated into 4 panels: Low income, Middle income, Lower middle 
income and Upper middle income countries2. Owing to constraints in data availability and in a 
bid to obtain more updated policy implications, the data-set spans from 2002-20103. Details of 
summary  statistics(Appendix  1),  correlation  analysis(Appendix  2),  variable  definitions 
(Appendix  3)  and  presentation  of  countries  (Appendix  4)  are  in  the  appendices.  In  the 
selection of variables, while the economic and social dimensions of globalization are reflected 
in the HDI, the political dimension is captured by good governance indicators.
3.1.1 Endogenous variables
The  dependent  variables  are  the  ‘corruption-control’  indicator  and  Corruption 
Perception Index(CPI); consistent with the corruption literature(Billger & Goel,2009; Okada 
& Samreth,2012; Asongu,2012b). While  Lalountas et  al.(2011) have used only the CPI, in a 
bid for robustness we complement this measure with the ‘corruption-control’ indicator.  For 
the CPI, scaling is from 0 to 10  with 0 showing the maximum corruption level. This implies, 
2 Whereas  Lalounta et al.(2011) use a threshold of :  GDP>825 US Dollars,  we use four levels of income  
distribution in accordance with the World Bank Income group setting.  The groups include: low income, $1,005  
or  less;  lower middle income,  $1,006 - $3,975;  upper middle income,  $3,976 -  $12,275;  and high  income, 
$12,276 or more. 
3 While Lalounta et al.(2011) use cross sectional data for the year 2006, the present paper is based on panel data 
between 2002-2010.
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as  the  index  increases  there  is  the  perception  of  lower  corruption  in  the  country.  The 
corruption-control measure varies for the most part between -1 and 1. With -1 for the least 
measure in the fight against corruption.  
3.1.2 Exogenous variable 
The  endogenous-explaining(exogenous)  variable  is  the  inequality  adjusted  Human 
Development Index(HDI). The HDI is a comparative measure of life expectancy,  literacy, 
education and standards of living for countries worldwide. This index has been widely used in 
the globalization (Mohammad et al.,2010; Rabbanee et al.,2010) and corruption(Nielsen & 
Hauguaard, 2000;   Akçay, 2006) literature. 
3.1.3 Instrumental variables
Borrowing from Lalountas et  al.(2011) the instrumental variables in linear estimations 
include indicators  of  trade and financial liberalizations (in levels and first differences) as 
well as the first difference of the HDI. While trade liberalization is measured by the economic 
openness indicator(Trade), financial openness is proxied by Foreign Direct Investment(FDI), 
in line with the globalization literature(Mohammad et al.,2010; Asongu, 2012a). Both FDI 
and ‘Trade’ are in percentages of GDP. Under the assumption of nonlinearity, the squares of 
the HDI, ‘Trade’ and FDI are added to the level and first difference  instruments: consistent 
with Lalountas et  al.(2011). For further robustness in the nonlinearity assumption, nonlinear 
combinations  of  instrumental  variables  are  complement  with  nonlinear  combinations  of 
endogenous  explaining  variables(see  Table  4  below  on:  extension  of  the  nonlinearity 
assumption with HAC standard errors). 
3.1.4 Control variables 
In accordance  with  Lalountas  et   al.(2011)  and recent  African  government-quality 
literature(Asongu,  2011a,  Asongu,  2012c)  we  control  for  good  governance  in  terms  of 
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democratic  institutions  and  voice  &  accountability.  Thus  we  expect  these  indicators  to 
increase the CPI as well as the control of corruption. Note should taken of the fact that, an 
increase in the CPI amounts to a decrease in  corruption level. 
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity
The concern for endogeneity could be emphasized on three main counts. (1)Though 
there is an implicit assumption that  human development affects government quality in the 
perspective of (the fight against)  corruption,  the reversed effect cannot be ruled-out since, 
human development is also contingent on corrupt practices. Thus the strict exogeneity of the 
human development channel is questionable. (2) The CPI is a synthesis of  perception based 
measures which are often subject to bias resulting from media propaganda or other factors. 
Therefore there is glaring evidence of omitted variables. (3) From a topical consideration, we 
seek  to  assess  the  relationship  between  three  phenomena,  which  by definition  inherently 
requires an Instrumental Variable(IV) estimation technique. 
3.2.2 Estimation technique
In  line  with  Lalountas  et   al.(2011)  we  use  Two-Stage  Least  Squares(TSLS)  as 
estimation approach. We adopt the following steps in this approach. Firstly, we justify the 
choice of the estimation technique(TSLS over OLS) with the Hausman test for endogeneity. 
Secondly, we demonstrate that instrumental variables(globalization indicators) are exogenous 
to  the  endogenous  components  of  the  human  development  channel,  conditional  on  other 
covariates(control  variables).  Lastly  we  investigate  the  validity  of  the  globalization 
instruments  with  the  Sargan-OIR(Over  Identifying  Restrictions  test)4.  The   TSLS-IV 
estimation method adopted by this study  will entail the following steps.
4 The Hausman and Sargan OIR tests are absent in Lalountas et  al.(2011). However we argue these two are  
indispensable for the selection of the IV approach and validity of the instruments respectively. 
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First-stage regression: 
++= itit TradeHD )(10 γγ itFDI )(2γ  υα ++ itiX                  (1)                                        
Second-stage regression:
++= itit HDCorruption )(10 γγ +itiXβ   µ                      (2) 
The independent control variables are represented by X in the two equations. In Eq.(1) 
and  Eq.(2),  v  and u  respectively denote the disturbance terms. Trade and financial openness 
(FDI)   represent  globalization    instruments.  ‘HD’ stands  for  human  development  while 
corruption entails the CPI or corruption-control indicator. 
3.2.3 Robustness checks 
For  robustness  purposes,  the  empirical  analysis:  (1)  uses  alternative  indicators  of 
corruption  ;  (2)  makes  use of  four  distinct  income levels  to  emphasis  wealth  effects;  (3) 
accounts  for  endogeneity;  (4)  models  under  both  linear  and  nonlinear  hypotheses;  (5) 
estimates with and without  HAC(Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent) standard 
errors. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
This  section  addresses  the  ability  of  the  exogenous  components  of  human 
development to account for differences in the CPI and corruption-control; the ability of the 
globalization  instruments  to  explain  variations  in  the  endogenous  components  of  human 
development and the possibility of the globalization instruments to account for the CPI and 
corruption-control beyond human development channels. To make these assessments, we use 
the panel  TSLS-IV estimation  method  with financial  and trade  liberalization  measures  as 
instrumental variables. 
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4.1 Development and globalization 
Table 1 below assesses the validity of the globalization  instruments in explaining 
cross-country differences in human development and government-quality control variables. 
Clearly,  it  could be observed that  distinguishing African  countries  by trade  and financial 
liberalizations help explain cross-country differences  human development and government 
quality.  Based on the  Fisher-test,  the  instruments  taken together  enter  significantly  in  all 
regressions at the 1% significance level for the most part. It is worth noting this is the first-
stage of the IV estimation approach where-by globalization instruments must be exogenous to 
the  endogenous  components  of  human  development  and  second-stage  regression  control 
variables,  conditional  on  other  covariates(first-stage  control  variables).  Most  of  the 
coefficients are significant with the right signs and the following could be established. (1) 
While trade openness improves human development, financial openness does the contrary. 
These findings are consistent with recent African openness literature(Asongu, 2012a). The 
positive effect of trade on human development could be elucidated by the cheap imports in 
basic human needs flooding African markets from China and beyond. On the other hand, the 
negative  effect  of  financial  openness  confirms  the  relative  lack  of  a  financial  service 
comparative advantage in the African financial industry. The negative financial liberalization 
effect can also be elucidated by rate of capital flight (approximately 39%) from Africa due to 
corruption and risky investments in the continent(Collier et al.,2001). From a global view- 
point,  the results of financial  openness are consistent with empirical investment-inequality 
literature(Pan-Long,1995; Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009; Asongu, 2011b) and 
theoretical  postulations(Greenwood  &  Jovanovic,  1990).  All  these  have  emphasized  the 
disequalizing redistributive income effect  of foreign investment, which in contextual terms 
depict decrease in inequality adjusted human development. (2) GDP per capita growth has a 
positive effect on human development. This is consistent with its constituency in the HDI. (3) 
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Development  assistance  is  detrimental  to  human  development:  in  line with  the  aid-
development  literature  on  developing  countries  (Boone,1996;  Reichel,1995;  Ghura,1995; 
Pedersen,1996; Asongu, 2012d). (4) Financial globalization improves government quality: in 
accordance  with  Klitgaard(1988).  (5)  From common  sense  to  a  certain  extent  economic 
theory,  regulation  quality(autocracy)  improves(decreases)  government  quality.  Given  the 
validity  of  joint  significance(Fisher  test)  in  estimated  coefficients,  we  proceed  with  the 
second-stage of the TSLS approach. 
Table 1: Human development and globalization instruments 
Development    Channel Government  Quality  Control  Variables
Human  Development(HDI) Democracy Voice and Accountability
Constant 0.421*** 0.435*** 0.525*** 1.613** 2.581*** 4.271*** -0.172** 0.015 -0.16**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.002) (0.000) (0.023) (0.745) (0.048)
Globalization
Instruments 
Trade 0.001*** 0.0009*** --- 0.017** 0.015** --- 0.001 --- 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.030) (0.109) (0.009)
FDI -0.005*** 0.001 --- 0.002 0.073 --- 0.015** --- ---
(0.001) (0.248) (0.965) (0.167) (0.013)
d_Trade --- --- 0.006*** --- --- 0.025 --- 0.003 ---
(0.006) (0.277) (0.226)
d_FDI --- --- 0.0007 --- --- 0.101 --- 0.016* 0.012
(0.313) (0.181) (0.080) (0.187)
Control 
Variables 
GDPpcg --- 0.005** 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- ---
(0.030) (0.391)
NODA --- -0.004*** -0.004*** --- --- --- --- --- ---
(0.000) (0.000)
GDPg --- --- --- 0.215** 0.194* --- --- ---
(0.021) (0.055)
R Q --- --- --- 4.537*** 4.580*** 0.964*** 0.969*** 0.951***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocracy --- --- --- --- --- -0.077*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R² 0.114 0.374 0.265 0.015 0.323 0.282 0.636 0.623 0.635
Fisher 14.065*** 29.641*** 15.894*** 2.637* 25.22*** 18.33*** 89.788*** 73.98*** 77.70***
Observations 204 192 166 204 204 177 204 177 177
*,**,***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1% respectively.  Trade:  Economic  Openness.  FDI:  Financial   Openness.  d_FDI:  first 
difference in FDI . d_Trade: first difference in Trade. GDPpcg:  GDP per capita growth.  NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.  
GDPg: GDP growth. R Q: Regulation Quality. 
4.2 Corruption, human development and globalization
Tables 2-3 investigate  two main  issues:  (1)  the  ability  of  the  human development 
channel to explain changes in the CPI and corruption-control and; (2) the possibility of the 
globalization  instrumental  variables  explaining  changes  in  the  CPI  and corruption-control 
beyond the human development channel. Whereas we address the first issue by investigating 
the significance of estimated coefficients, the second is assessed by the Sargan-OIR test for 
15
instrument validity.  The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the view that the instruments 
account  for corruption dynamics   only through the human development  channel.  Thus  a 
rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  is  the  rejection  of  the  view that  the  instruments  explain 
corruption dynamics through no other mechanisms than human development channels. The 
Hausman-test  for  endogeneity  precedes  every  TSLS-IV  regression  and  thus  justifies  the 
choice of the estimation approach. The null hypothesis  of this test is the stance that OLS 
estimates are consistent and efficient. Thus a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the 
concern of reverse causality (endogeneity) we have elucidated earlier (see Section 3.2.1) and 
hence lends credit to the TSLS-IV estimation approach. Else, we model by OLS under strict  
exogeneity in the human development channel.  While panel A of Tables 2-3 is under the 
assumption of linear globalization instrumental variables(first and second set of instruments), 
panel  B  is  on  the  premise  of  nonlinear  instruments  (third  and  fourth  set  of  moment 
conditions).   
Table 2 presents second-stage results with HAC standard errors. While findings of 
panel A are under a linear assumption, those of Panel B are under a nonlinear hypothesis.  But 
for three estimations in panel A and one in panel B the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is 
overwhelmingly rejected in models of Table 2, confirming the presence of endogeneity and 
hence the choice of the TSLS-IV approach. As concerns the first issue,  based on results in 
panel A and B, the following could be established. (1) Human development reduces corrupt 
practices  and improves the fight against corruption when instrumental globalization variables 
are linear and nonlinear. (2) While human development increases(decreases) corruption(the 
control of corruption) in Upper middle income countries, the opposite effect is noticed for 
Lower middle  income countries.  (3)  Overall  findings  for  Middle  income countries  reflect 
those of Lower middle countries while results of Low income countries are insignificant. (4) 
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Control  variables  are  significant  with  the  right  signs  since  democracy  and  voice  & 
accountability improve corruption-control and decrease corrupt activities. 
Table 2:  IV regressions without HAC standard errors 
Panel A:  Linear Instrumental Variables  
Corruption  Perception Index(CPI) Corruption-Control
Data UMI LMI MI LI Data UMI LMI MI LI
Constant 0.677 11.27*** 0.078 3.180 3.615*** -1.84*** 3.95*** -0.077 -2.348* 0.414
(0.410) (0.000) (0.960) (0.273) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.966) (0.083) (0.563)
IHDI 2.849* -11.3*** 8.041*** -0.890 -1.694 1.660* -6.07*** 1.934 2.877 -2.429
(0.076) (0.000) (0.003) (0.863) (0.506) (0.097) (0.000) (0.528) (0.218) (0.133)
Demo 0.278*** 0.20*** --- 0.276*** --- 0.173*** 0.106*** --- 0.144*** ---
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
V& A --- --- 1.479*** --- 0.519 --- --- 1.610*** --- 0.046
(0.000) (0.266) (0.000) (0.899)
Hausman 8.550** 9.596*** 13.05*** 6.722** 1.208 15.66*** 11.68*** 58.55*** 4.378 2.447
(0.013) (0.008) (0.001) (0.034) (0.546) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.112) (0.294)
Sargan-OIR 2.297 2.303 4.220 0.376 4.761 2.397 2.334 1.550 1.821 1.386
(0.513) (0.316) (0.238) (0.828) (0.190) (0.494) (0.311) (0.670) (0.402) (0.500)
Adjusted  R² 0.346 0.903 0.713 0.376 0.185 0.376 0.975 0.510 0.620 0.008
Fisher 6.899*** 62.68*** 24.29*** 6.751*** 0.666 10.07*** 253.0*** 9.515*** 9.681*** 1.125
Observations 157 21 62 83 74 177 21 66 87 90
Instruments 1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 1st Set 1st Set 1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 1st Set 2nd Set
First Set of Instruments Constant, FDI,  Trade,  d_FDI,  d_Trade ,  d_IHDI
Second Set of Instruments Constant, FDI,  Trade,  d_FDI,  d_Trade
 Panel B:  Nonlinear Instrumental Variables  
Corruption  Perception Index(CPI) Corruption-Control
Data UMI LMI MI LI Data UMI LMI MI LI
Constant -0.028 11.03*** 0.271 -1.232 2.821*** -1.81*** 3.827*** -1.62*** -2.41*** -0.425
(0.951) (0.000) (0.508) (0.158) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.169)
IHDI 4.265*** -11.0*** 7.771*** 6.932*** -0.056 1.636*** -5.88*** 3.963*** 2.96*** -0.649
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.944) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.317)
Demo 0.276*** 0.206*** --- 0.235*** --- 0.165*** 0.104*** --- 0.152*** ---
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
V& A --- --- 1.533*** --- 0.250 --- --- 1.087*** --- -0.157
(0.000) (0.293) (0.000) (0.575)
Hausman 11.18*** 10.93*** 32.89*** 24.58*** 1.829 14.88*** 4.896* 20.23*** 19.66*** 6.448**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.400) (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039)
Sargan-OIR 7.479 3.601 4.840 5.937 6.947 3.971 6.115 15.66** 3.706 6.628
(0.278) (0.462) (0.564) (0.203) (0.325) (0.680) (0.190) (0.015) (0.447) (0.356)
Adjusted  R² 0.404 0.903 0.697 0.576 0.215 0.378 0.976 0.724 0.620 0.071
Fisher 25.04*** 69.45*** 50.93*** 21.58*** 0.568 20.93*** 280.3*** 39.93*** 22.43*** 0.677
Observations 157 21 62 83 74 177 21 66 87 90
Instruments 3rd Set 4th Set 3rd Set 3rd Set 3rd Set 3rd Set 4th Set 3rd Set 3rd Set 3rd Set
Third  Set of Instruments Constant, FDI,  Trade, d_FDI,  d_Trade ,  d_IHDI,  FDI²,  Trade²,  IHDI²
Fourth  Set of Instruments Constant, FDI,  Trade, d_FDI,  d_Trade ,  FDI²,  Trade²
*,**,***:  significance levels  of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity  and Autocorrelation  Consistent.  UMI:  Upper 
Middle Income.  LMI:  Lower Middle Income.  MI: Middle Income.  LI:  Lower  Income.  IHDI:  Inequality Adjusted Human Development 
Index.  Demo: Democracy.  V& A: Voice and Accountability.  OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test.  FDI:  Foreign Direct Investment.  
Trade: Openness. d_FDI: first difference in FDI . d_Trade: first difference in Trade. FDI²: FDI Square. Trade²: Trade Square. 
As concerns the second-issue,  failure to reject  the null hypothesis of the OIR test in 
15 of the 16 ‘Fisher-significant’  regressions implies that globalization instruments  explain 
corruption  through no other mechanisms beside human development and good governance 
channels. Thus the globalization instruments are valid as they are not correlated with the error 
term in the equation of interest. All four regressions pertaining to  Low income countries have 
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insignificant  Fisher  statistics;  which  is  why the  Sargan-OIR test  analysis  is  based  on 16 
regressions. 
Table 3:  IV regressions with HAC standard errors 
Panel A:  Linear Instrumental Variables  
Corruption  Perception Index(CPI) Corruption-Control
Data UMI LMI MI LI Data UMI LMI MI LI
Constant 0.677 11.27*** 0.078 3.180 3.615*** -1.846* 3.951*** -0.077 -2.348 0.414
(0.601) (0.000) (0.979) (0.487) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.986) (0.341) (0.588)
IHDI 2.849 -11.3*** 8.041* -0.890 -1.694 1.660 -6.07*** 1.934 2.877 -2.429
(0.269) (0.000) (0.084) (0.913) (0.430) (0.412) (0.000) (0.761) (0.512) (0.235)
Demo 0.278** 0.209*** --- 0.276 --- 0.173** 0.106*** --- 0.144*** ---
(0.047) (0.000) (0.194) (0.026) (0.000) (0.003)
V& A --- --- 1.479* --- 0.519*** --- --- 1.610 --- 0.046
(0.061) (0.001) (0.217) (0.888)
Hausman 8.550** 9.596*** 13.05*** 6.722** 1.208 15.66*** 11.68*** 58.55*** 4.378 2.447
(0.013) (0.008) (0.001) (0.034) (0.546) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.112) (0.294)
Sargan-OIR 2.297 2.303 4.220 0.376 4.761 2.397 2.334 1.550 1.821 1.386
(0.513) (0.316) (0.238) (0.828) (0.190) (0.494) (0.311) (0.670) (0.402) (0.500)
Adjusted  R² 0.346 0.903 0.713 0.376 0.185 0.376 0.975 0.510 0.620 0.008
Fisher 2.623* 105.8*** 14.26*** 0.905 5.086*** 2.724* 655.3*** 12.80*** 4.400** 1.112
Observations 157 21 62 83 74 177 21 66 87 90
Instruments 1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 1st Set 1st Set 1st Set 2nd  Set 1st Set 1st Set 2nd  Set
First Set of Instruments Constant, FDI,  Trade,  d_FDI,  d_Trade ,  d_IHDI
Second Set of Instruments Constant, FDI,  Trade,  d_FDI,  d_Trade
Panel B:  Nonlinear Instrumental Variables  
Corruption  Perception Index(CPI) Corruption-Control
Data UMI LMI MI LI Data UMI LMI MI LI
Constant -0.028 11.03*** 0.271 -1.232 2.821*** -1.81*** 3.827*** -1.62*** -2.41** -0.425
(0.974) (0.000) (0.699) (0.443) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.511)
IHDI 4.265*** -11.0*** 7.771*** 6.932** -0.056 1.636** -5.88*** 3.96*** 2.965 -0.649
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.971) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.694)
Demo 0.276** 0.206*** --- 0.235*** --- 0.165** 0.104*** --- 0.152*** ---
(0.015) (0.000) (0.008) (0.014) (0.000) (0.001)
V& A --- --- 1.533*** --- 0.250 --- --- 1.087*** --- -0.157
(0.006) (0.262) (0.000) (0.570)
Hausman 11.18*** 10.93*** 32.89*** 24.58*** 1.829 14.88*** 4.896* 20.23*** 19.66*** 6.448**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.400) (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039)
Sargan-OIR 7.479 3.601 4.840 5.937 6.947 3.971 6.115 15.66** 3.706 6.628
(0.278) (0.462) (0.564) (0.203) (0.325) (0.680) (0.190) (0.015) (0.447) (0.356)
Adjusted  R² 0.404 0.903 0.697 0.576 0.215 0.378 0.976 0.724 0.620 0.071
Fisher 6.193*** 205.9*** 16.03*** 13.70*** 0.821 4.354** 4015*** 23.20*** 12.16*** 0.197
Observations 157 21 62 83 (0.443) 177 21 66 87 90
Instruments 3rd Set 4th Set 3rd Set 3rd Set 3rd Set 3rd Set 4th Set 3rd Set 3rd Set 3rd Set
Third  Set of Instruments Constant, FDI,  Trade,  d_FDI,  d_Trade ,  d_IHDI,  FDI²,  Trade²,  IHDI²
Fourth  Set of Instruments Constant, FDI,  Trade,  d_FDI,  d_Trade ,  FDI²,  Trade²
*,**,***:  significance levels  of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity  and Autocorrelation  Consistent.  UMI: Upper 
Middle Income.  LMI:  Lower Middle Income.  MI: Middle Income.  LI:  Lower  Income.  IHDI:  Inequality Adjusted Human Development 
Index.  Demo: Democracy.  V& A: Voice and Accountability.  OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test.  FDI:  Foreign Direct Investment.  
Trade: Openness. d_FDI: first difference in FDI . d_Trade: first difference in Trade. FDI²: FDI Square. Trade²: Trade Square. 
For robustness purposes, regressions in Table 2 are replicated in Table 3 with HAC 
standard errors.  The two issues on significance of estimated coefficients and validity of the 
instruments still apply in the interpretation of the regression output. Results in Table 3 are 
robust to those in Table 2, both in terms of  significance in estimated coefficients and validity 
of the instruments.
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4.3 Further robustness tests on nonlinearity 
For further robustness purposes, in line with  Lalountas et  al.(2011) we extend the 
nonlinearity  hypothesis  from  globalization  instruments  to  the  human  development 
endogenous explaining variable. Thus we use the squared HDI and level good governance 
variables as explaining variables. With these nonlinear interactions in both instrumental and 
endogenous explaining variables, findings do not appear to differ from those in Tables 2-3. 
Table 4:  Extension of the nonlinearity assumption with HAC standard errors 
Panel A: Nonlinear  endogenous variable with linear instruments  
Corruption  Perception Index(CPI) Corruption-Control
Data UMI LMI MI LI Data UMI LMI MI LI
Constant 1.178** 7.288*** 2.380*** 1.852** 2.802*** -1.41*** 1.87*** -0.367 -1.11*** -0.603
(0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.518) (0.006) (0.118)
IHDI² 3.964*** -7.57*** 6.850*** 2.372 -0.046 1.511** -4.26*** 3.82*** 1.065 -0.695
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.266) (0.980) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.314) (0.745)
Demo 0.238** 0.172*** --- 0.272** --- 0.170** 0.096*** --- 0.161** ---
(0.027) (0.000) (0.043) (0.024) (0.000) (0.016)
V& A --- 1.508*** --- 0.241 --- --- 1.374*** --- -0.221
(0.007) (0.223) (0.009) (0.428)
Hausman 12.77*** 0.339 29.37*** 42.84*** 1.542 16.46*** 5.023* 44.67*** 58.13*** 5.867*
(0.001) (0.843) (0.000) (0.000) (0.462) (0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053)
Sargan-OIR 4.371 9.832** 3.781 1.628 5.453 2.278 6.300 4.549 5.844 2.738
(0.358) (0.043) (0.436) (0.803) (0.243) (0.684) (0.177) (0.336) (0.211) (0.602)
Adjusted  R² 0.423 0.901 0.713 0.515 0.216 0.377 0.975 0.696 0.582 0.090
Fisher 6.58*** 3763*** 16.57*** 4.607** 0.798 4.108** 33599*** 8.395*** 4.725** 0.346
Observations 157 21 62 83 74 177 21 66 87 90
Instruments 5th Set  5th Set  5th Set  5th Set  5th Set  5th Set  5th Set  5th Set  5th Set  5th Set  
Fifth Set of Instruments Constant, IHDI,  FDI,  Trade,  d_FDI,  d_Trade ,  d_IHDI
Panel B: Nonlinear  endogenous variable with nonlinear instruments  
Corruption  Perception Index(CPI) Corruption-Control
Data UMI LMI MI LI Data UMI LMI MI LI
Constant 1.127** 7.31*** 2.392*** 1.841*** 2.844*** -1.38*** 1.831*** -0.553* -1.11*** -0.463*
(0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.005) (0.071)
IHDI² 3.966*** -7.61*** 6.877*** 2.836* -0.076 1.506** -4.21*** 3.442*** 1.103 -0.825
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.965) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.277) (0.607)
Demo 0.253** 0.171*** --- 0.209* --- 0.162** 0.099*** --- 0.158** ---
(0.013) (0.000) (0.051) (0.012) (0.000) (0.017)
V& A --- --- 1.529*** --- 0.336 --- --- 1.054*** --- 0.022
(0.006) (0.119) (0.000) (0.930)
Hausman 14.55*** 1.090 28.40*** 43.37*** 0.167 14.79*** 3.170 16.07*** 82.94*** 1.000
(0.000) (0.579) (0.000) (0.000) (0.681) (0.000) (0.204) (0.000) (0.000) (0.317)
Sargan-OIR 8.570 10.343 4.254 22.42*** 8.815 4.21 7.824 18.11*** 11.518* 12.837*
(0.199) (0.110) (0.642) (0.001) (0.266) (0.648) (0.251) (0.005) (0.073) (0.076)
Adjusted  R² 0.414 0.901 0.711 0.541 0.216 0.380 0.975 0.724 0.584 0.033
Fisher 6.644*** 3956*** 16.29*** 5.061*** 1.491 4.575** 13569*** 27.70*** 4.659** 0.154
Observations 157 21 62 83 74 177 21 66 87 90
Instruments 6th Set 6th Set 6th Set 6th Set 6th Set 6th Set 6th Set 6th Set 6th Set 6th Set
Sixth   Set of Instruments Constant, IHDI,  FDI,  Trade,  d_FDI,  d_Trade ,  d_IHDI, FDI²,  Trade²
*,**,***:  significance levels  of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity  and Autocorrelation  Consistent.  UMI: Upper 
Middle Income.  LMI:  Lower Middle Income.  MI: Middle Income.  LI:  Lower  Income.  IHDI:  Inequality Adjusted Human Development 
Index.  Demo: Democracy.  V& A: Voice and Accountability.  OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test.  FDI:  Foreign Direct Investment.  
Trade: Openness. d_FDI: first difference in FDI . d_Trade: first difference in Trade. FDI²: FDI Square. Trade²: Trade Square. IHDI²: IHDI 
Square. 
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4.4 Discussion, policy implications and limitations
4.4.1 Retrospect to hypotheses and policy implications 
Before delving into the discussion of results,  it  is  vital  to highlight the hypotheses 
motivating  this  paper.  Lalountas  et   al.(2011)  state:“Thus,  our  main  conclusion  is  that  
globalization  could be a powerful means of fighting corruption, only for middle and high  
income countries. For low income countries however, globalization has no significant impact  
on corruption. We might therefore conclude that at low levels of per capita income emphasis  
is given to the economic dimension of international integration and as a result the effect of  
globalization on corruption is limited. Persistence on globalization as an effective means to  
reduce  corruption  in  developing  countries  might  lead  to  inappropriate  policies. On  the  
contrary, at high levels of per capita income emphasis is given to the political and social 
dimensions of globalization and as a result  the effects  of  this phenomenon on corruption  
control are significant”(Lalountas et al., 2011, p.645). We have tested these hypotheses in 
Africa from different methodological  and contextual  standpoints.  Though not form, yet  in 
substance our intuition and motivation are compatible with those of Lalountas et al.(2011). In 
the analysis, while the economic and social dimensions of globalization have been reflected in 
the  HDI,  the  political  dimension  has  been captured  by good governance  indicators.   For 
clarity in elucidations, we shall dissect the hypotheses in the light of our empirical results.
Hypothesis 1: Globalization is a powerful tool in fighting corruption. True
Our  analysis  demonstrates  that  globalization(in  terms  of  trade  and  finance) 
instrumented  on  human  development  mitigates(ameliorates)  corruption(the  control  of 
corruption)  in  Africa.  In  plainer  terms,  globalization  is  an  instrumental  tool  in  fighting 
corruption through human development and good governance. As a policy implication, there 
is need for human development and government quality to go hand in glove before such an 
achievement  could  be  discounted. As  we have  observed  from findings  in  Table  1,  trade 
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liberalization  is  the  component  of  globalization  that  improves  human  development.  This 
positive outcome could emanate from cheap imports in basic human needs flooding African 
markets  from China  and  beyond(Asongu,  2012a).  It  follows  that  cheap  imports  increase 
consumer purchasing power,  thus decreasing incentives  to subsistence-oriented corruption. 
Therefore this finding broadly confirms the theoretical underpinning from  Klitgaard(1988) in 
which  corruption thrives when monopoly is combined with discretion and low accountability. 
The positive effect of trade openness on human development diminishes incentives to bribery 
common to societies governed by monopolistic activities. 
Hypothesis  2: Globalization is an important tool of fighting corruption only in Middle and 
High income countries. Partially True.
While  globalization  is an  important  tool  in  the  fight  against  corruption  in  Middle 
income  countries,  this  hypothesis  is  valid  only  for  Lower  middle  income  countries.  The 
hypothesis  is  a  subject  to  controversy  in  Upper  middle  income(UMI)  countries.  Three 
countries make-up the UMI bracket of the data: Libya, Botswana and Mauritius(see Appendix 
4). To elucidate the unexpected outcome of UMI results, we regress the HDI on ‘Trade’ and 
FDI conditional on other covariates(GDP per capita and development assistance) for UMI 
countries and find  the following: (1) the positive effect of trade openness on the HDI is 
insignificant ; (2) the negative effect of FDI on the HDI is  four times greater in comparison to 
the African average.  We therefore only partially concur with Lalountas et al.(2011) in the 
assertion  that  at  high  levels  of  per  capita,  emphasis  is  given  to  the  political  and  social 
dimensions  of globalization  and as a  result  the effect  of this  phenomenon on corruption-
control is significant. 
 Hypothesis 3: For Low income countries globalization has no significant impact on 
corruption. True
21
Our  analyses  concur  with  this  hypothesis,  which  is  robustly  valid.  Thus  we  join 
Lalountas  et  al.(2011) in concluding that  at  low levels  of per capita  income,  emphasis  is 
placed on the economic dimension of international integration and as a result the effect of 
globalization on corruption is limited. As a policy implication, persistent globalization as an 
effective means to reduce corruption in low income  countries might lead to inappropriate 
policies. 
Hypothesis 4:  Hypotheses  one and two are valid only under linearity. False 
According to Lalountas et al.(2011), linearity is a good approximation only for middle 
and  high  income  countries  because  under  the  assumption  of  a  linear  model,  a  positive 
correlation between corruption and globalization exists, while when linearity is dropped there 
seems to be no significant effect of globalization on corruption(p.636). We are skeptical of the 
validity of this hypothesis on two counts. (1) Firstly, the last column of Table 4 on page 644 
in Lalountas et al.(2011),  runs counter to the premise of the hypothesis, since globalization 
(KOF indicator)  still  has  a  significant  positive  effect  on the CPI when GDP> 825 under 
nonlinear endogenous and instrumental variables. (2)  Secondly, using nonlinear globalization 
instrumental  variables  independently  as  well  as  collectively  with  endogenous  nonlinear 
explaining variables, we have not found the substance of this hypothesis in the context of 
Africa. 
4.4.2 Further discussions and limitations 
Over the past decades, the issue of corruption and the search for strategies to fight its  
corrosive effects have grown in importance as a topic of public debate and a criterion by 
which  the  civil  society evaluates  leadership.  This  increased  attention  is  motivated  by the 
realization  among  international  development  experts  that  development  requires  above  all 
good governance.  The combat  against  corruption  remains  an important  priority  of  policy 
making bodies in the African continent. 
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Globalization is the dominant force in the economic universe as it upholds economic 
prosperity in its lusty, ineluctable and historical process whose march can be stopped only by 
endangering the prosperity of people and nations. This phenomenon has also been alleged to 
disfigure human development in the manner it is evolving as it seeks a victory of market over 
government  and  self-interest  over  altruism(Asongu,  2012a).  The  public  support  for 
globalization has waned and prompted universal demands to recapture some of its attractive 
glow and lofty ambitions, so that the phenomenon be given a human face. 
Many international institutions consider globalization as a powerful tool to fighting 
corruption since it presupposes structural and institutional reforms such as liberalization of 
commodity  markets,  strengthening  of competition,  extended  transfer  of  technology  and 
managerial  expertise,  securing of  property rights,  rule  of  law,  transparency and increased 
quality  of  public  services  that  improve  country  attractiveness  with  respect  to  trade  and 
investment. These reforms constitute the transmission channel via which globalization affects 
the control of corruption. 
This  paper  has  assessed  the  Lalountas  et  al.(2011)   hypotheses  and  results(as 
elucidated  in  the  previous  section)  are  in  line  with the  neoliberal  school,  contrary to  the 
hegemony thesis on globalization. Thus, we may firmly conclude from a corruption-control 
standpoint that  globalization is an omnipresent power of ‘creative destruction’ and side with 
Rodrik et al.(2004) in postulating that the phenomenon is closely tied to human development; 
which constitutes a decisive factor in societal institutional building(fighting corruption). 
An important limitation to take into account is that studies of this kind depend to a 
great  extent  on  the  integrity  of  the  proxy  for  corruption  obtained  from perception-based 
measures. Thus omitted variables and media-effect may substantially influence perceptions on 
corruption  and  consequently  bias  the  link  between  globalization  instruments,  the  human 
development indicator and corruption measures. However, to the best of our knowledge there 
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are no better measurements of corruption than those from African Development Indicators of 
the World Bank.  The paper  has  limited  the ills  of  this  draw-back by using two different 
measures  of corruption.  Also,  the application  of an estimation  approach that  accounts for 
endogeneity addresses the concerns of omitted variables  and bias in the perception based 
measures.
5. Conclusion
Is globalization instrumental in fighting corruption? Do wealth effects matter in this 
fight? Are findings valid when the linearity assumption is dropped? This paper has assessed 
the  Lalountas  et   al.(2011)  hypotheses  in  the  African  context. Though  not  form,  yet  in 
substance the intuition and motivation are compatible with those of Lalountas et al.(2011). 
Four  hypotheses have been tested from different methodological and contextual standpoints. 
In the analysis, while the economic and social dimensions of globalization have been reflected 
in  the HDI,  the political  dimension has  been captured  by good governance  indicators.  A 
TSLS-IV estimation technique has been  applied where-in globalization instruments of trade 
and financial liberalization are instrumented on human-development  and government-quality 
to account for corruption(corruption-control)  effects.  Thus the intuition has been to assess 
how  globalization  is  instrumental  in  the  fight  against  corruption  through  human 
development(economic and social dimensions) and government quality(political dimension). 
Findings  could  be  summarized  in  the  following.  Hypothesis  1:  Globalization  is  a 
powerful tool of fighting corruption (True). Hypothesis 2: Globalization is an important tool 
of fighting corruption only in Middle and High income countries(Partially True). Hypothesis  
3:  For  low income countries  globalization has  no  significant  impact  on  corruption(True). 
Hypothesis 4:  Hypotheses  1 and 2 are valid only under linearity(False). 
In  terms  of  policy  implications:  (1)  in  countries  with  high  levels  of  per  capita, 
emphasis is placed on the political and social dimensions of globalization and as a result the 
24
effect  of  this  phenomenon  on  corruption-control  is  significant;  (2)  on  the  other  hand,  in 
nations with low levels of per capita income, emphasis is given to the economic dimension of 
international integration and as a result the effect of globalization on corruption is limited; (3) 
persistent globalization as an effective means to reduce corruption in developing countries 
might lead to inappropriate policies for low income countries.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Dependent Variables Corruption Perception Index 2.930 0.986 1.500 6.400 225
Corruption Control Indicator -0.591 0.559 -1.535 1.086 270
Independent Variables Human Development Index 0.468 0.128 0.242 0.809 270
First-Stage Control 
Variables 
GDP per capita growth 2.398 3.941 -33.07 29.06 269
GDP growth 4.701 4.126 -31.30 33.62 270
Development Assistance 11.728 16.058 -0.251 148.30 237
Regulation Quality -0.594 0.556 -1.895 0.905 270
Autocracy 1.707 3.535 -8.000 9.000 270
Second-Stage Control 
Variables 
Democracy 2.807 4.306 -8.000 10.00 270
Voice & Accountability -0.695 0.710 -1.969 0.947 270
Instrumental Variables 
Low Income 0.600 0.490 0.000 1.000 270
Middle Income 0.400 0.490 0.000 1.000 270
Lower Middle Income 0.300 0.459 0.000  1.000 270
Upper Middle Income 0.100 0.300 0.000 1.000 270
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
Dependent 
Variables
Ind 
Vble
2nd Stage 
Control Vles
First Stage Control Variables Instrumental Variables
CPI CC IHDI Demo V &A GDPpcg GDPg NODA RQ Auto LI MI LMI UMI
1.000 0.919 0.536 0.401 0.575 0.039 -0.089 -0.241 0.799 0.014 -0.393 0.393 0.042 0.549 CPI
1.000 0.462 0.482 0.633 0.124 0.025 -0.223 0.811 0.088 -0.354 0.354 0.078 0.459 CC
1.000 0.073 0.056 0.091 -0.041 -0.508 0.470 0.434 -0.674 0.674 0.291 0.655 IHDI
1.000 0.758 0.139 0.121 -0.038 0.498 0.066 0.074 -0.074 -0.241 0.247 Demo
1.000 0.055 0.041 -0.025 0.703 -0.293 0.032 -0.032 -0.200 0.253 V& A
1.000 0.979 -0.013 0.157 0.212 0.010 -0.010 -0.048 0.057 GDPpcg
1.000 0.088 0.075 0.152 0.141 -0.141 -0.135 -0.024 GDPg
1.000 -0.393 -0.331 0.427 -0.427 -0.322 -0.212 NODA
1.000 0.070 -0.304 0.304 0.090 0.358 RQ
1.000 -0.258 0.258 0.237 0.059 Auto
1.000 -1.000 -0.801 -0.408 LI
1.000 0.801 0.408 MI
1.000 -0.218 LMI
1.000 UMI
CPI: Corruption Perception Index. CC: Control of Corruption. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. Demo: Democracy.  
V&A: Voice and Accountability. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. GDPg: GDP growth. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. RQ:  
Regulation Quality. Auto: Autocracy. LI: Low Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. Ind  
Vble: Independent Variable.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Sources
Corruption CPI Corruption  Perception  Index World Bank(WDI)
Control of Corruption CC Corruption Control Indicator World Bank(WDI)
Development HDI Inequality Adjusted  HDI World Bank(WDI)
GDP per capita growth GDPpcg GDP per capita growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
GDP growth GDPg GDP growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Development Assistance NODA Net Official Development Assistance(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality RQ Regulation Index World Bank(WDI)
Autocracy Auto Autocracy Index(-10 to 10) World Bank(WDI)
Democracy Demo Democracy Index (-10 to 10) World Bank(WDI)
Freedom and Accountability V & A Voice and Accountability World Bank(WDI)
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  
Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num.
Income Levels
Low Income Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Chad,  Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic Republic, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, 
Mozambique, Rwanda,  Togo, Uganda, Zambia.
18
Middle Income Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Libya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
12
Lower Middle Income Cameroon, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Morocco, Senegal, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
9
Upper Middle Income Botswana, Libya,  Mauritius. 3
Num: number of countries 
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